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INTRODUCTION

Awaiting Acceptance: You have just made an offer to sell fifty
sofas to a furniture store. The store manager says he will
e-mail his acceptance later that day. Your e-mail system’s
third-party spam filter, which inspects messages before
they enter your system, is somewhat overactive. Through
no fault of the store manager, the filter deletes the
1
message and you never see it.
Rotten Recall: A television company is conducting a
voluntary recall of one of its most popular models. The
company sends you an e-mail recall notice. In order to
ensure that the notice will reach as few customers as
possible, the company intentionally doctors the e-mail to
include large fonts and colorful text. The e-mail enters
your system and your spam filter intercepts it. The e-mail
2
is routed to your junk mail folder and you never see it.
Flower Fanatic: You are a member of a flower gardening
interest group called “flowers-r-us.”
Members send
gardening tips to each other through e-mail. These
messages say “flowers-r-us” in the subject line. Since you
receive numerous “flowers-r-us” e-mails each day, you
create a rule on your computer to route all such e-mails to
a “gardening” folder, which you check infrequently. One
day, you see an interesting tip on how to care for
hydrangeas, and you forward the e-mail to a business
associate. The associate replies, “Great article! By the
way, I’ve attached a new offer for the contract we’ve been
working on.” Since “flowers-r-us” is still included in the
subject line, the reply e-mail gets routed to the gardening
3
folder and you never read it.
The Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA) defines
4
when an electronic message is “sent” and “received.” However,
1. See Dean N. Alterman, Guess What Your Spam Filter Just Bought for You,
PORTLAND BUS. J. (Apr. 4, 2004, 9:00 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/portland
/stories/2004/04/05/focus5.
2. See Cem Kaner, SPAM, Filtering, and Commercial Legislation, CEM KANER,
J.D., PH.D. (May 1, 2003, 5:53 AM), http://kaner.com/?p=25.
3. This hypothetical is adapted from an interview with Michael J. McGuire,
Chief Info. Sec. Officer, Littler Mendelson, in St. Paul, Minn. (Sept. 10, 2012).
4. See UETA § 15(a), (b) (1999).
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several issues emerge upon application of these definitions to
5
situations like the hypotheticals above. Is a message received if it is
intercepted by an overactive filter, or is the sender out of luck?
Does it matter whether the recipient’s spam filter is located inside
or outside of the recipient’s server? Should it matter who manages
the recipient’s spam filter—the recipient, the system manager, or a
third-party contractor? Does a recipient have recourse when a
message is intercepted by a spam filter due to the sender’s
negligent or sharp practices? One court has suggested a draconian
solution:
In defending their failure to [acknowledge the court’s email notice], the appellants offer nothing but an updated
version of the classic “my dog ate my homework” line. . . .
Imperfect technology may make a better scapegoat than
the family dog in today’s world, but not so here. Their
counsel’s effort at explanation, even taken at face value, is
6
plainly unacceptable.
This note, however, will argue that the solution is not so cutand-dry. Part II will briefly chronicle the rise of electronic
communication and the laws that govern it and will highlight the
similarities and differences between the laws’ definitions of “send”
7
and “receive.” Part III will review the development of spam filters
and illustrate the uncertainties that arise when spam filters interact
8
with UETA’s definitions of “send” and “receive.”
Part IV will explore three partial and concurrent solutions to
the spam filter issue: (1) a rebuttable presumption that a properly
sent record is received, (2) use of the consumer-protection
provision in the Electronic Signatures in Global and National
Commerce Act (E-SIGN) to provide insulation from sharp business
practices, and (3) a test that allocates responsibility to both sender
9
and recipient according to the factors that each party controls.
The note will conclude by arguing that, since both sender and
recipient benefit from the use of electronic communication, both
parties should share the responsibility of preventing messages from
10
being intercepted by spam filters.
5. See generally Thomas J. Smedinghoff, Electronic Document Delivery and the
Problem of Spam Filters, 4 PRIVACY & SECURITY L. REP. 301 (2005).
6. Fox v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 389 F.3d 1291, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
7. See infra Part II.
8. See infra Part III.
9. See infra Part IV.
10. See infra Part V.
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II. HISTORY OF ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATION LAWS
A.

Rise in Electronic Communication

In the late 1960s, businesses began to develop electronic data
interchange (EDI), which allowed them to communicate
electronically with standardized purchase orders, invoices, and
11
This new technology resulted in fewer
other documents.
transmission errors, lowered transaction costs, better customer
12
service, and improved cash flow. By 1991, EDI was used by 15,000
13
As EDI fundamentally changed the way
companies worldwide.
contracts for the sale of goods were entered into and performed,
proponents realized that existing law (including common law and
the UCC) potentially made those electronic documents legally
14
unenforceable.
The ABA Electronic Messaging Services Task Force wrote the
EDI Model Trading Partners Agreement (“EDI Model Agreement”)
15
to dispel these concerns. The EDI Model Agreement sought to
“assur[e] the validity and predictability of the related commercial
[EDI] transactions” and included the first definition of an
16
electronic writing. Drafters knew, however, that the EDI Model
Agreement was only a “first step” and recommended “the
development of an ongoing comprehensive strategy to accomplish
17
appropriate legal reform.”
The earliest electronic communication laws in the United
18
States diverged widely at the state level. Some state statutes were
technology-specific, while others were media-neutral; some were
19
narrow in scope, while others were broad. Some states combined
20
these approaches while others did nothing at all. A sharp rise in
11. Elec. Messaging Servs. Task Force, Am. Bar Ass’n., The Commercial Use of
Electronic Data Interchange—A Report and Model Trading Partner Agreement, 45 BUS.
LAW. 1645, 1649 (1990); Christina L. Kunz, The Definitional Hub of E-commerce:
“Record,” 45 IDAHO L. REV. 399, 401 (1999).
12. Kunz, supra note 11, at 401.
13. Id.
14. Elec. Messaging Servs. Task Force, Am. Bar Ass’n., supra note 11, at 1649–
50.
15. See generally id.
16. Kunz, supra note 11, at 403–04.
17. Elec. Messaging Servs. Task Force, Am. Bar Ass’n., supra note 11, at 1647.
18. See Robert A. Wittie & Jane K. Winn, Electronic Records and Signatures Under
the Federal E-SIGN Legislation and the UETA, 56 BUS. LAW. 293, 294–96 (2000).
19. Id. at 295–96.
20. Id.
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the use of electronic communication, combined with the lack of
uniformity in state statutes, created the need for uniform laws to
facilitate and encourage electronic commerce, validate electronic
21
transactions, and foster uniformity.

B.

Scope of Electronic Communication Laws

The following chart briefly summarizes the scope and
adoption of the relevant electronic communication laws that have
been drafted since 1996: the U.N. Model Law on Electronic
Commerce (“Model Law”), UETA, the Uniform Computer
Information Transactions Act (UCITA), E-SIGN, and the U.N.
Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in
22
International Contracts (“Convention”).

21. See UETA § 6; UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE WITH
GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, at 30, U.N. Doc. A/51/162, U.N. Sales No. E.99.V.4 (1999)
[hereinafter UNCITRAL].
22. For more information, see 2 IAN C. BALLON, E-COMMERCE AND INTERNET
LAW § 15.01 (2d ed. 2011); DOCUMENTING E-COMMERCE TRANSACTIONS §§ 2:2, 3:2,
4:1 (William A. Hancock ed., 2011).
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Model Law
(1996)
Drafter
U.N.
Commission
on
International
Trade Law
(UNCITRAL)
Where
Provides a
Adopted
framework for
national
24
legislation
Scope of
Model Law
Covered
art. 1:
Transactions Commercial
activity

Notable
Exclusions

None, but
limiting
language is
suggested in
Model Law
article one

UETA
(1999)
National
Conference of
Commissioners
on Uniform
State Laws
23
(NCCUSL)
Forty-seven
states, D.C.,
and U.S. Virgin
25
Islands
UETA § 5(b):
Parties
agreeing to
communicate
28
electronically
UETA § 3(b):
Wills and
trusts, UCITA,
UCC (except
Article Two)

UCITA
(1999)
NCCUSL

E-SIGN
(2000)
Congress

[Vol. 39:4

Convention
(2005)
UNCITRAL

Countries
where
Convention is
27
ratified
UCITA
Convention
15 U.S.C.
§ 103:
art. 1, para. 1:
§ 7001(a):
Computer
Interstate or Parties
Information foreign
located in
29
different
commerce
countries
UCITA
15 U.S.C.
Convention
§ 103(d):
§ 7003(a):
art. 2, para. 1:
Exclusions
Wills, trusts, Consumer
are
family law,
transactions
extensive
UCC
(except
Article Two)
Maryland
and
26
Virginia

United
States

Each electronic communication law defines what “writings” are
within its scope. UETA defines a “record” as “information that is
inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or
30
other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.”
An
“electronic record” is “a record created, generated, sent,
31
This
communicated, received, or stored by electronic means.”
definition is nearly identical to those found in the Model Law,
23. NCCUSL is now known as the Uniform Law Commission (ULC).
24. UNCITRAL, supra note 21, at 16–17.
25. See UETA Refs. & Annots. (West, Westlaw through 2011 annual
meetings) (excluding Illinois, New York, and Washington).
26. BALLON, supra note 22, § 15.03[1]. Four states have enacted statutes to
prevent UCITA from governing a contract entered into by their citizens. See id.
27. Ratification has been limited. See Status 2005—United Nations Convention
on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts,
UNCITRAL,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/electronic
_commerce/2005Convention_status.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2013).
28. Such agreements are determined by context and should be broadly
construed (e.g., ordering goods online or including an e-mail address on a
business card). UETA § 5(b), cmt. 4 (1999).
29. Congress intends for E-SIGN to apply broadly. Adam R. Smart, E-SIGN
Versus State Electronic Signature Laws: The Electronic Statutory Battleground, 5 N.C.
BANKING INST. 485, 492 n.46 (2001).
30. UETA § 2(13).
31. Id. § 2(7).
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32

UCITA, E-SIGN, and the Convention. It intends to encompass all
types of electronic information, including those arising from
33
“foreseeable technical developments.”
Similarly, the laws
consistently define an “information processing system” as “an
electronic system for creating, generating, sending, receiving,
34
storing, displaying, or processing information.”
C.

Relevant Provisions of Electronic Communication Laws

The main thrust of the electronic communication laws
discussed above is that an electronic record or signature may not be
35
denied legal effect solely because it is in an electronic form. In
other words, the difference between an electronic and paper
36
record is irrelevant in judging the legal validity of a document.
The laws also provide requirements regarding accuracy of an
37
38
39
original document, attribution, and retention capability. They
40
do not, however, require electronic records to be used, nor do
41
they establish the legal validity of an electronic record —that
32. See 15 U.S.C. § 7006(4) (2006) (defining “electronic record”); United
Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International
Contracts, G.A. Res. 60/21, art. 4(c), U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/21 (Nov. 23, 2005)
[hereinafter Convention] (defining “data message”); Model Law on Electronic
Commerce, G.A. Res. 51/162, art. 2(a), U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/162 (Dec. 16, 1996)
[hereinafter Model Law] (same); UCITA § 102(a)(26), (55) (2002) (defining
“electronic” and “record”).
33. See UNCITRAL, supra note 21, at 23–24, 26.
34. UETA § 2(11); see Convention, supra note 32, art. 4(f) (defining
“information system”); Model Law, supra note 32, art. 2(f) (same); UCITA
§ 102(36) (2002) (defining “information processing system”). Although E-SIGN
does not provide a definition of “system,” UETA’s definition applies in states that
have enacted UETA. See infra text accompanying notes 58–60.
35. See 15 U.S.C. § 7001(a); Convention, supra note 32, art. 8, para. 1; Model
Law, supra note 32, art. 5; UCITA § 107; UETA § 7.
36. UETA § 7 cmt. 1; see also U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, UNITED
NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE USE OF ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS IN
INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS, at 47, U.N. Doc. A/Res/60/21, U.N. Sales No.
E.07.V.2 (2007) [hereinafter UNCITRAL] (“[E]lectronic communications [will]
achieve the same degree of legal certainty as paper-based communications.”).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 7001(d)(1); Model Law, supra note 32, art. 8; UETA § 12(a).
38. Model Law, supra note 32, art. 13; UETA § 9.
39. 15 U.S.C. § 7001(d); Model Law, supra note 32, art. 10; UETA § 12.
40. 15 U.S.C. § 7001(b)(2); UNCITRAL, supra note 21, at 30 (“[T]he Model
Law . . . should not be construed in any way as imposing [the use of electronic
means of communication].”); UETA § 5(a).
41. UETA Refs. & Annots. Prefatory Note B (West, Westlaw through 2011
annual meetings); UNCITRAL, supra note 21, at 32; see BALLON, supra note 22,
§ 15.02[2][A] (“[E-SIGN] generally does not alter substantive contract law.”).
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determination is left to the applicable area of substantive law.
The electronic communication laws also define when
43
electronic records are sent and received. UETA provides:
(a) [A]n electronic record is sent when it:
(1) is addressed properly or otherwise directed properly
to an information processing system that the recipient has
designated or uses for the purpose of receiving electronic
records or information of the type sent and from which
the recipient is able to retrieve the electronic record;
(2) is in a form capable of being processed by that system;
and
(3) enters an information processing system outside the
control of the sender . . . or enters a region of the
information processing system designated or used by the
44
recipient which is under the control of the recipient.
A message is addressed or directed properly to a recipient
when there is “specific information which will direct the record to
45
the intended recipient.”
Subsection (a)(3) provides that an
electronic record is sent when it leaves the sender’s system or, if the
message never leaves the sender’s system, when the record is under
46
the recipient’s control (i.e., when the record is received).
The UETA definition of “receipt” is essentially a subset of its
definition of “sent” because a received message has necessarily
47
been sent. It provides:
(b) [A]n electronic record is received when:
(1) it enters an information processing system that the
recipient has designated or uses for the purpose of
42. UETA employs a “minimalist approach” to ensure solely that electronic
records are “treated in the same manner . . . as written records.” UETA Refs. &
Annots. Prefatory Note (Westlaw). Similarly, the goal of the Model Law is to
create a “media-neutral environment.” UNCITRAL, supra note 21, at 17.
43. See Model Law, supra note 32, art. 15; UETA § 15. These provisions may
be varied by agreement. See Model Law, supra note 32, art. 15 (stating that the
definition applies “[u]nless otherwise agreed”); UETA § 15 (same).
44. UETA § 15(a); see also Convention, supra note 32, art. 10, para. 1
(defining “dispatch”); Model Law, supra note 32, art. 15, para. 1 (same).
45. UETA § 15 cmt. 2. This definition covers mass mailings but not “general
broadcast message[s], sent to systems rather than individuals . . . .” Id.
46. Id. § 15(a)(3) & cmt. 2. For example, employees of the same university
or corporation may share the same system. Id. § 15 cmt. 2. In such a situation,
sending and receipt are simultaneous. UNCITRAL, supra note 21, at 55.
47. R. David Whitaker, An Overview of Some Rules and Principles for Delivering
Consumer Disclosures Electronically, 7 N.C. BANKING INST. 11, 21 (2003); see UETA
§ 15(a), (b).
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receiving electronic records or information of the type
sent and from which the recipient is able to retrieve the
electronic record; and
(2) it is in a form capable of being processed by that
system. . . .
....
(e) An electronic record is received . . . even if no
48
individual is aware of its receipt.
Subsection (b)(1) defines receipt as the time that an
electronic record is capable of being retrieved, as opposed to when
49
If receipt were
the message is accessible or actually viewed.
otherwise defined, a recipient could effectively block receipt by not
50
accessing or viewing the record. Additionally, it is impractical for
the sender to prove not only that a record was received but that it
51
was also accessed or viewed. Since e-mail protocol cannot provide
52
automatic acknowledgment of receipt, such proof would require a
recipient’s manual acknowledgment, which the recipient could
easily falsify (and could require acknowledgment of the
53
acknowledgment, etc.).
Subsection (e) notes that an electronic record may be received
54
before the recipient has read it or even knows of its existence. Up
until the 1999 NCCUSL Annual Meeting, the UETA draft also
48. UETA § 15(b), (e); see also Model Law, supra note 32, art. 15, para. 2
(defining “receipt”).
49. UETA § 15(b)(1); see Elec. Messaging Servs. Task Force, Am. Bar Ass’n.,
supra note 11, at 1732 (stating that a message is received under the EDI Model
Agreement when it is “accessible to the receiving party”).
50. See Richard A. Lord, A Primer on Electronic Contracting and Transactions in
North Carolina, 30 CAMPBELL L. REV. 7, 62 (2007) (“[T]he recipient is foreclosed
from arguing that he did not receive the information simply because he did not
access it . . . .”); cf. Henk Snijders, The Moment of Effectiveness of E-mail Notices, in ECOMMERCE LAW 79, 80 (Henk Snijders & Stephen Weatherill eds., 2003) (arguing
in favor of a receipt rule similar to that in UETA).
51. Snijders, supra note 50, at 80.
52. Telephone Interview with Michael Fleming, Senior Corporate Counsel,
Cray, Inc. (Sept. 21, 2012). The current standard e-mail protocol, RFC-5321, is
based on an e-mail protocol written in 1989. Id.; see Simple Mail Transfer Protocol,
INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE (Oct. 2008), http://tools.ietf.org/html
/rfc5321.
53. Telephone Interview with Michael Fleming, supra note 52; cf. CHRISTINA
L. KUNZ & CAROL L. CHOMSKY, CONTRACTS: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 343 (2010)
(discussing the same concept regarding the mailbox rule). The EDI Model
Agreement does require verification of receipt. Elec. Messaging Servs. Task Force,
Am. Bar Ass’n., supra note 11, at 1667.
54. UETA § 15 cmt. 5. The paper equivalent is an unread letter in a
mailbox. Id.
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stated that an electronic record was effective upon receipt, rejecting
55
Although UCITA retains this
the common law mailbox rule.
56
provision, the UETA Drafting Committee decided not to alter
substantive contract law in an effort to preserve media neutrality
57
and avoid bad policy.
While E-SIGN does not contain sending and receiving rules,
58
UETA’s definitions still apply in states where it is enacted. E-SIGN
does not preempt UETA when a state enacts the official version of
UETA or enacts a similar law that is consistent with E-SIGN and
does not grant preferred status to a certain technology used for
59
If the state-enacted legislation is
creating electronic records.
exempted from preemption and E-SIGN does not contain a
60
comparable provision, then the UETA provision applies.
Therefore, UETA’s send and receipt rules apply, notwithstanding
E-SIGN, in states that have enacted the official UETA or a similar
61
law.
The 2005 Convention modifies the definition of “receipt” in
62
two ways. Unlike UETA and the Model Law, which define receipt
as the time that the record enters the recipient’s system, a record is
not received under the Convention until it is “capable of being
63
retrieved by the [recipient].”
However, UNCITRAL did not
intend this language to demonstrate a modification from the
55. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, DRAFT FOR
APPROVAL: UNIFORM ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS ACT § 114(e) & n.5 (1999),
available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/electronic%20transactions
/etaam.pdf.
56. See UCITA § 214(a), cmt. 2 (2002) (“Subsection (a) . . . reject[s] the
mailbox rule for electronic messages . . . .”).
57. Amelia H. Boss, The Uniform Electronic Transactions Act in a Global
Environment, 37 IDAHO L. REV. 275, 335 (2001).
58. See 15 U.S.C. § 7002(a) (2006).
59. Id.
60. See id. (allowing state law to “modify, limit, or supersede” E-SIGN); Shea
C. Meehan & D. Benjamin Beard, What Hath Congress Wrought: E-sign, the UETA,
and the Question of Preemption, 37 IDAHO L. REV. 389, 406 (2001) (“[W]here the
UETA has provisions with no analog in E-sign . . . , the UETA will apply.”).
61. A state enactment of UETA likely need not be a “pristine” version of the
official UETA in order to be exempted from preemption. See Meehan & Beard,
supra note 60, at 403–04 (finding that a requirement of a pristine adoption could
cause “absurd results”).
62. See Convention, supra note 32, art. 10.
63. Id. art. 10, para. 2. Compare Model Law, supra note 32, art. 15, para. 2
(enters a “designated information system”), and UETA § 15(b)(1) (1999) (enters
an “information processing system”), with Convention, supra note 32, art. 10, para.
2. The time at which an electronic record is capable of retrieval is “left for the
applicable law.” UNCITRAL, supra note 36, at 61.
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64

Model Law receipt requirements. The Convention also includes a
presumption that a record is “capable of being retrieved by the
65
[recipient] when it reaches the [recipient]’s electronic address.”
This presumption “may be rebutted by evidence showing that the
[recipient] had in fact no means of retrieving the
66
communication.”
III. SPAM FILTERS AND THEIR INTERACTION WITH UETA
A.

Spam—Definition and Early Prevention Efforts

Spam is most broadly defined as “[u]nsolicited commercial e67
mail.” In November 2012, an estimated sixty-three percent of e68
mail was spam. There are three types of spam: messages sent by
legitimate marketers who are concerned with customer privacy,
messages that “employ quasi-legal methods” to recruit as many
customers as possible, and “traditional” spam sent by malicious
software that converts computers into “botnets” to relay potentially
69
harmful messages.
In an effort to curb the disruption caused by spam, as well as
70
its toll on the economy, Congress enacted the Controlling the

64. See UNCITRAL, supra note 36, at 61–62 (“[T]he rules on receipt of
electronic [records] in the . . . Convention [are] consistent with article 15 of the
UNCITRAL Model Law . . . .”).
65. Convention, supra note 32, art. 10, para. 2. There is no substantive
difference between “electronic address” and “information system.” UNCITRAL,
supra note 36, at 62.
66. UNCITRAL, supra note 36, at 62 (citation omitted). In 2009, the ULC
considered amending UETA to mirror the Convention’s presumption
requirement. See Henry D. Gabriel & D. Benjamin Beard, 2009 Annual Meeting
Report, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION 2 (May 29, 2009), http://www.uniformlaws.org
/Committee.aspx?title=UN%20E-Commerce%20Convention
(follow
“2009
Annual Meeting Report, Exhibit D” hyperlink). Instead, the ULC urged Congress
to ratify the Convention (which Congress has not done). Id. at 1 (follow “2009
Annual Meeting Report” hyperlink).
67. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1524 (9th ed. 2009); see also David Lorentz, The
Effectiveness of Litigation Under the CAN-SPAM Act, 30 REV. LITIG. 559, 562 (2011)
(“[N]either the courts nor any secondary sources have provided a consistent
definition of ‘spam.’”).
68. Darya Gudkova, Spam in November 2012, SECURELIST (Dec. 19, 2012),
http://www.securelist.com/en/analysis/204792258.
69. See Lorentz, supra note 67, at 564–67; Kara Rowland, Clever Spammers Stay
‘One Step Ahead’ of Law, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2006, at A1.
70. See Jonathan Krim, Spam’s Cost to Business Escalates; Bulk E-mail Threatens
Communication Arteries, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2003, at A1 (estimating that spam
would cost U.S. organizations over $10 billion in 2003).
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Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act (“CAN71
SPAM Act”) in 2003. Among its goals were to reduce the amount
of spam received in inboxes, increase the convenience of e-mail
communication, discourage the sending of “vulgar” materials, and
72
prevent spammers from misleading spam recipients. The CANSPAM Act prohibits the sending of false, misleading, or deceptive
73
information; requires the inclusion of a functioning return e-mail
74
address; and requires the sender to provide an opportunity for
75
the recipient to “opt-out” of receiving future messages.
It is
unclear as to whether the CAN-SPAM Act has effected a decrease in
76
the amount of spam received by e-mail users. Some critics argue
that, while the Act successfully curbs the spamming practices of
“legitimate” companies, those companies make up only a small
77
percentage of the spamming population.
Others contend that
Congress’s intent was to “legalize legitimate, unsolicited e78
marketing” rather than decrease the amount of spam received.
Regardless, spam has continued to pose a major threat to e-mail
79
security and e-commerce.
B.

Advent of Spam Filters

An excessive amount of spam, coupled with the lack of
effective legislation, necessitated the creation of spam filtering
80
programs. In general, a spam filter reduces the amount of spam
81
received by filtering out messages that appear to be spam. When
71. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7701–13 (2006).
72. Id. § 7701.
73. Id. § 7704(a)(1), (2).
74. Id. § 7704(a)(3).
75. Id. § 7704(a)(5).
76. Compare FED. TRADE COMM’N, EFFECTIVENESS AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE
CAN-SPAM ACT 7 (2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/canspam05
/051220canspamrpt.pdf (noting a decrease in spam), with John Soma et al., Spam
Still Pays: The Failure of the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003 and Proposed Legal Solutions, 45
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 165, 165 (2008) (noting an increase in spam).
77. Rowland, supra note 69.
78. Lorentz, supra note 67, at 576; see also Matthew E. Shames, Note, Congress
Opts Out of Canning Spam, 66 U. PITT. L. REV. 385, 403 (2004) (noting that Congress
did not want to restrict all spam, as e-mail “is an inexpensive way for businesses to
advertise their products” (quoting 149 CONG. REC. S13,125 (daily ed. Oct. 23,
2003) (statement of Sen. Feingold))).
79. See Smedinghoff, supra note 5 (“[S]pam . . . threatens to render e-mail
useless as a means of communication.”).
80. See id. (“One very promising solution is spam filtering.”).
81. See L. Elizabeth Bowles et al., Am. Bar Ass’n, Program Materials:
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a filter identifies a message as spam, it deletes the message or
82
Spam filters typically
“quarantines” it into a junk mail folder.
block messages based on the sender’s domain name (e.g.,
83
“@wmitchell.edu”) and the message’s content.
Spam filters block e-mails sent from specific domain names by
84
relying on realtime blackhole lists (RBLs). RBLs are maintained
by third-party list generators, who can be either for-profit
85
When the RBL generator
companies or “good Samaritans.”
suspects a domain name of sending spam, the domain is
“blacklisted” by inclusion on the RBL. Additionally, some RBL
generators maintain a list of server relays that spammers frequently
86
use.
Spam filters purchase RBLs and block the domains and
87
servers included on the lists.
Although RBLs greatly reduce the amount of spam that ends
88
up in a user’s inbox, they may block legitimate e-mails as well.
Since the lists are compiled in part from individual complaints,
89
RBLs can be inaccurate. An RBL can blacklist a domain merely
90
because the domain’s server allows spamming activity. Further, a
legitimate domain may have difficulty getting removed from the list
91
and may have to pay a fee.
Second, spam filters examine a message’s content by searching
92
for phrases, words, and layouts that “look[] like spam.”
Each
Technological Controls on Spam and Their Legal Implications, LARKIN HOFFMAN 5 (Apr.
2005), http://www.larkinhoffman.com/files/OTHER/47.pdf.
82. Smedinghoff, supra note 5.
83. See How Does the Spam Filter Work?, U. PENN. ENGINEERING, http://www.seas
.upenn.edu/cets/answers/spamblock-filter.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2013).
84. Id. For more information on RBLs, see SPAMHAUS, http://www.spamhaus
.org (last visited Feb. 20, 2013).
85. Interview with Michael J. McGuire, supra note 3.
86. Carla Schroder, Realtime Black-Hole Lists: Heroic Spam Fighters or Crazed
Vigilantes?, ENTERPRISE NETWORKING PLANET (Feb. 24, 2003), http://www
.enterprisenetworkingplanet.com/netsysm/article.php/1594561/.
87. A small minority of spam filters instead use “whitelists,” which allow email only from the domains included on the list. Bowles et al., supra note 81, at 7.
This method results in fewer spam messages but requires significant upkeep on
the part of the recipient to keep the whitelist current. Id.
88. See Schroder, supra note 86 (demonstrating that a spam-friendly server
can result in the blocking of all domains using that server).
89. Bowles et al., supra note 81, at 6.
90. See Schroder, supra note 86 (asserting that some RBLs block “both
spammers and open relays”).
91. See Bowles et al., supra note 81, at 6; see also SBL Delisting Procedure,
SPAMHAUS, http://www.spamhaus.org/sbl/delistingprocedure/ (last visited Feb.
20, 2013) (outlining procedures for removal from a Spamhaus RBL).
92. How Does the Spam Filter Work?, supra note 83. For example, the filter may
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instance of an irregular word or phrase increases the message’s
93
Once the score is high enough, the message is
“spam score.”
94
95
filtered. Like RBLs, content filters may be influenced by users.
96
Content filters require a great deal of upkeep. Spamming
trends change over time to reflect world events, so the words and
97
phrases used in spam will change accordingly.
In addition, a
spammer will frequently change her approach in an attempt to
98
Due to the specific advantages and
“beat” the spam filter.
disadvantages of RBL and content filters, most spam filters use a
99
combination of domain-based and content-based blockers.
A message is likely to pass through numerous filters on its
100
journey from sender to recipient.
First, the sender’s system may
filter the message to protect against outbound spam and to prevent
101
the release of sensitive information. Next, the message will likely
pass through several “relay” servers, each of which may have its own
102
filter system.
Upon arrival at the recipient’s system, a message
may pass through a filter maintained by the system manager or by a
103
third-party agent of the manager.
These filters may be located
104
Finally, the recipient’s
outside or within the recipient’s system.
105
individual workstation is likely to apply a final round of filters.
Despite attempts to intercept only illegitimate or harmful
search for words like “Viagra” or layouts such as large fonts and blinking lights. Id.
93. Bowles et al., supra note 81, at 8–9. For an example of the various tests
employed by spam filters, see What Headers Are Added to E-mails That Are Scanned by
SpamAssassin?, LAMP HOST, http://www.lamphost.com/node/82 (last visited Feb.
20, 2013).
94. Bowles et al., supra note 81, at 9.
95. See, e.g., So Much Time, So Little Spam, GOOGLE, http://mail.google.com
/intl/ar/mail/help/fightspam/spamexplained.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2013)
(“When the Gmail community . . . report[s] a particular email as spam, our
system . . . block[s] similar messages.”).
96. See Bowles et al., supra note 81, at 10 (“The rules need to be constantly
updated . . . .”).
97. See Gudkova, supra note 68 (noting that, in November 2012, a
considerable amount of spam referenced Hurricane Sandy and the upcoming
holiday season).
98. See Rowland, supra note 69 (noting that spammers have learned how to
“throw off filter keyword searches”).
99. See Bowles et al., supra note 81, at 6, 8–10 (noting the advantages and
disadvantages of each filtering method).
100. Interview with Michael J. McGuire, supra note 3.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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messages, spam filters nevertheless intercept some legitimate
106
messages as well. In an informal survey conducted by the author,
twenty-five percent of respondents found one or more personal emails (i.e., a message intended for the recipient alone) in their
junk e-mail folder. Eighty-one percent of respondents found one
or more commercial e-mail (i.e., a mass-produced e-mail sent to
107
many recipients) to which they had subscribed.
C.

Interaction Between Spam Filters and UETA

Spam filters were not on the radar of the UETA Drafting
108
Committee. Although spam is believed to have been invented in
109
the mid-1990s, it did not become a major concern until the mid110
Consequently, UETA was drafted and enacted without
2000s.
attention to spam filters, and the interaction between UETA and
spam filters has become a source of contention among experts in
electronic communication laws and among states that have enacted
111
UETA. Businesses have been forced to accept the deluge of spam
106. Survey questions are available at Spam and Junk Mail Survey,
SURVEYMONKEY, http://www.surveymonkey.com/s/9HDHCGG (last visited Feb.
20, 2013).
107. Respondents reported that 5% of the e-mails in the junk mail folder were
personal e-mails, 32% were commercial e-mails, and 62% were spam.
108. Telephone Interview with D. Benjamin Beard, Reporter, UETA Drafting
Comm. (Sept. 14, 2012); Telephone Interview with Thomas J. Smedinghoff, Am.
Bar Ass’n Advisor, UETA Drafting Comm. (asserting that the Committee was more
concerned with the “time and place” of delivery than the “fact” of delivery). But
see Kaner, supra note 2 (asserting that the Committee did consider spam filters).
109. Credence E. Fogo, The Postman Always Rings 4,000 Times: New Approaches
to Curb Spam, 18 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 915, 915–16 (2000) (claiming
that spam was invented by two lawyers seeking to advertise their services).
110. Jonathan Krim, FTC Files Suit Against Sender of Porn ‘Spam,’ WASH. POST,
Apr. 18, 2003, at E1 (noting that spam represented 8% of all e-mail traffic in 2001
and 40% in 2003).
111. See, e.g., Assembly Comm. on Judiciary, AB 328 Bill Analysis, CAL. LEGIS.
INFO. 8 (May 5, 2009), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09-10/bill/asm/ab_0301
-0350/ab_328_cfa_20090504_125946_asm_comm.html (opposing a bill that would
allow insurance companies to send notifications electronically); Smedinghoff,
supra note 5 (“If . . . the message is quarantined or deleted by a spam filter, has the
sender failed to . . . deliver information, or has the recipient assumed the risk?”);
Soma et al., supra note 76, at 169 (“When legitimate e-mails are accidentally
filtered, potentially important communications are lost.”); Bowles et al., supra note
81, at 5 (“[T]he fact that legitimate e-mail may be blocked by these increasingly
effective filters . . . mean[s] that your life . . . promises to become a lot more
uncertain . . . .”); Gail Hillebrand, Uniform Electronic Transactions Act: Consumer
Nightmare
or
Opportunity?,
CONSUMERS
UNION
(Aug.
23,
1999),
http://www.consumersunion.org/finance/899nclcwc.htm (“A message is received
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or install spam filters, knowing that some legitimate e-mail will
112
likely be blocked as well. These issues are likely to become more
significant as e-commerce continues to develop because more
113
communication will come under the purview of UETA.
The growing use of new technologies, such as messaging
through cell phones and social networks, makes spam filter issues
114
an even more pressing concern.
These technologies are quickly
115
replacing e-mail as the preferred method of communication, but
116
they lack the relative stability of e-mail systems. While most e-mail
117
servers retain a copy of e-mails that enter or leave the system,
118
most cell phone carriers do not retain text message content.
Although carriers do retain text message details (such as the name
of the sender and the date and time of dispatch), some new
messaging systems—such as Apple’s iMessage—circumvent the
119
carriers, making documentation even more uncertain.
Spammers have already become more active in soliciting cell phone
120
As spam filters become more commonplace in new
users.
121
technologies, they will likely encounter many of the same issues
that currently exist with e-mail; therefore, the interaction between
even . . . when the message was automatically discarded by a junk mail filter.”).
112. See Filters Cut Off E-mail That Businesses Want, WASH. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2004),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2004/feb/22/20040222-103456-4989r/
(“Many companies forgo paying for filters to block unwanted e-mail, fearing that
legitimate messages will be blocked.”).
113. See UETA § 5(b) (1999); see also supra note 28 & accompanying text.
114. See UETA § 2 cmt. 4 (advocating an expansive definition of “electronic”
so that UETA “will be applied broadly as new technologies develop”).
115. See Sarah Radwanick, The 2010 U.S. Digital Year in Review, COMSCORE 10–
11, 28 (Feb. 7, 2011), http://www.comscore.com/Press_Events/Presentations
_Whitepapers/2011/2010_US_Digital_Year_in_Review
(follow
“Download
Whitepaper” hyperlink) (noting a decrease in e-mail use and an increase in
messaging through social network and text message use in most age groups).
116. Interview with Michael J. McGuire, supra note 3.
117. See IMAP & POP, U. MINN., http://www.oit.umn.edu/email/imap
-pop/index.htm (last modified June 11, 2012) (demonstrating that modern e-mail
systems retain copies of messages on the server unless deleted by the recipient).
118. See
Retention
Periods
of
Major
Cellular
Service
Providers,
A.C.L.U., http://www.aclu.org/cell-phone-location-tracking-request-response-cell
-phone-company-data-retention-chart (last visited Feb. 20, 2013).
119. See Jenna Wortham, Free Texts Pose Threat to Carriers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10,
2011, at B1.
120. See Nicole Perlroth, Spam Invades a Last Refuge, the Cellphone, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 8, 2012, at A1 (noting a steep rise in text message spamming since 2009).
121. See Eric A. Taub, Eluding a Barrage of Spam Text Messages, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
5, 2012, at A9 (presenting a variety of spam filter tools provided by cell phone
carriers).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol39/iss4/9

16

Bindman: The Spam Filter Ate My E-Mail: When Are Electronic Records Receiv

2013]

SPAM FILTER ATE MY E-MAIL

1311

UETA and new technologies may pose an even greater problem
than the current e-mail issues.
IV. SOLUTIONS FOR DETERMINING IF A RECORD HAS BEEN RECEIVED
This section will explore three partial and concurrent
solutions for determining whether a filtered electronic record has
been sent and received: (1) a rebuttable presumption that a
message is received when it is properly sent or when it enters the
122
recipient’s system, (2) use of the consumer protection provisions
123
in E-SIGN, and (3) a test that accounts for the sender’s and
recipient’s ability to prevent a spam filter from intercepting an
124
electronic record.
A.

Rebuttable Presumption of Receipt
1.

Presumption in General

Presumption of receipt of paper mail has long existed in
125
American common law. Courts universally hold that a letter that
is properly directed and dispatched is presumed to have been
126
received by the recipient. Rather than a “conclusive presumption
of law,” the presumption is an “inference of fact” that the postal
127
service will properly deliver the letter.
Consequently, the
presumption may be rebutted by evidence that the letter was not
received, and the factfinder makes the final determination by
128
weighing the evidence brought by the sender and recipient.
The policy underlying the presumption of receipt is addressed
122. See infra Part IV.A.
123. See infra Part IV.B.
124. See infra Part IV.C.
125. E.g., Rosenthal v. Walker, 111 U.S. 185, 193–94 (1884); Grade v.
Mariposa Cnty., 64 P. 117, 117–18 (Cal. 1901); Pitts v. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins.
Co., 34 A. 95, 97 (Conn. 1895); Hamilton v. Stewart, 34 S.E. 123, 125 (Ga. 1899);
Ashley Wire Co. v. Ill. Steel Co., 45 N.E. 410, 413 (Ill. 1896); Huntley v. Whittier,
105 Mass. 391, 392–93 (1870); Plath v. Minn. Farmers’ Mut. Fire Ins. Ass’n, 23
Minn. 479, 484–85 (1877); Austin v. Holland, 69 N.Y. 571, 576 (1877).
126. E.g., Rosenthal, 11 U.S. at 193; accord Pitts, 34 A. at 97; Hamilton, 34 S.E. at
125; Huntley, 105 Mass. at 392; Austin, 69 N.Y. at 576. While the presumption is
often referred to as the “mailbox rule,” this author refrains from that term so as to
avoid confusion with the mailbox rule as applied to acceptance of an offer. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 63 (1981) (“[A]n acceptance . . . is
operative . . . as soon as put out of the offeree’s possession . . . .”).
127. Rosenthal, 11 U.S. at 193; Huntley, 105 Mass. at 392–93.
128. Rosenthal, 11 U.S. at 193–94; Huntley, 105 Mass. at 392–93.
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in Ashley Wire Co. v. Illinois Steel Co.:
The presumption that the letter was received is founded
upon the regularity and certainty with which the mail is
carried and delivered. When letters are properly stamped
and addressed, the uniformity with which they are
received is such that the failure to receive such letter is a
129
very unusual circumstance . . . .
The presumption is further strengthened by the fact that postal
workers “are charged by law with the proper delivery of the mail,
and are presumed to have performed those duties in a proper
130
manner.”
Courts have generally held that a positive and uncontradicted
denial of receipt is sufficient for a factfinder to determine that a
131
presumption of receipt has been rebutted. However, courts tend
to support a presumption of receipt when the recipient’s rebuttal is
132
less than a categorical denial of receipt or when the sender
contradicts the rebuttal with evidence that the letter likely was
133
received.
Regardless of whether the presumption of receipt is
met or rebutted, most courts hold that the burden of proving
134
receipt remains with the sender.
Presumption of receipt of e-mails has not been applied as
135
uniformly and universally as it has for paper mail. On one hand,
the Eighth Circuit has held that the presumption should apply to
“other forms of communication—such as . . . electronic mail . . . —
129. Ashley, 45 N.E. at 413.
130. Smedinghoff, supra note 5.
131. See, e.g., Planters’ Mut. Ins. Ass’n v. Green, 80 S.W. 151, 151 (Ark. 1904);
Grade v. Mariposa Cnty., 64 P. 117, 118 (Cal. 1901); Hill v. Wiles, 92 A. 996, 996–
97 (Me. 1915). But see In re Alexander’s, Inc., 176 B.R. 715, 721 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1995) (“[T]he addressee must do more than simply deny that it received notice.”).
A line of Georgia cases has held that an uncontradicted denial of receipt by the
recipient may overcome the presumption as a matter of law. See, e.g., Hamilton, 34
S.E. at 125.
132. See, e.g., W.E. Richmond & Co. v. Sec. Nat’l Bank, 64 S.W.2d 863, 869
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1933) (holding the presumption not overcome when the
recipient does not remember whether he received the letter or when another
company member may have received it).
133. See, e.g., Jensen v. McCorkell, 26 A. 366, 367 (Pa. 1893) (finding that the
presence of the sender’s return address strengthened the presumption of receipt).
134. Huntley v. Whittier, 105 Mass. 391, 392–93 (1870) (“[T]he burden of
proving . . . receipt remains throughout upon the party who asserts it.”); see also
Travelers’ Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn. v. Farmers’ Mut. Fire Ins. Ass’n of Monona
Cnty., 233 N.W. 153, 156 (Iowa 1930) (“[T]he burden of [proving receipt] is
nevertheless upon the [sender].”).
135. BALLON, supra note 22, § 14.05[3].
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provided they are accepted as generally reliable . . . .”
When
determining whether the presumption was properly rebutted,
courts have considered whether the notice was intercepted by a
137
138
spam filter, sent improperly due to a computer glitch, or
139
accessed on a different computer, as well as whether the sender
140
received a “bounce-back” message
or the recipient has
141
demonstrated a “lack of diligence.”
However, this line of cases has been limited solely to
142
presuming receipt of notice of an electronic court filing (ECF).
Thus far, courts have not determined whether a presumption of
143
Even if a
receipt exists for other e-mail and messaging systems.
court recognizes a presumption of receipt, it may require different
144
types of proof than those required for paper mail.
2.

Disadvantages of a Rebuttable Presumption of Receipt

Two different presumptions have been suggested as a solution
to the interaction between spam filters and UETA’s definition of
“send” and “receive.” The “strong” presumption is that an
electronic record should be presumed received when it is properly
145
sent.
The “weak” presumption is that a record should be
136. Am. Boat Co. v. Unknown Sunken Barge (Am. Boat Co. I), 418 F.3d 910,
914 (8th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).
137. Am. Boat Co. v. Unknown Sunken Barge (Am. Boat Co. II), 567 F.3d 348,
353 (8th Cir. 2009); see also Pace v. AIG, Inc., No. 8 C 945, 2010 WL 4530357, at *1,
*3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 1, 2010) (finding “excusable neglect” due in part to spam filter
excuse); In re Philbert, 340 B.R. 886, 890 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2006) (rejecting spam
filter excuse); Tobin v. Granite Gaming Grp. II, L.L.C., No. 2:07-CV-577-BES-PAL,
2008 WL 723337, at *10 (D. Nev. Mar. 17, 2008) (same).
138. Am. Boat Co. II, 567 F.3d at 353.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See Pace, 2010 WL 4530357, at *2 (“Unlike here, the cases cited . . .
involve situations where an attorney’s malfunctioning e-mail is just one example of
the attorney’s overall lack of diligence.”).
142. See Am. Boat Co. I, 418 F.3d 910, 914 (8th Cir. 2005); Dempster v.
Dempster, 404 F. Supp. 2d 445, 449 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
143. Cf. BALLON, supra note 22, §14.05[3] (“In many cases . . . the
presumption of receipt should not necessarily apply merely because a
communication was sent.”).
144. See SSI Med. Servs., Inc. v. State Dept. of Human Servs., 685 A.2d 1, 6 n.1
(N.J. 1996); see also BALLON, supra note 22, § 14.05[3] (“Not all of the assumptions
underlying . . . evidentiary presumptions on terra firma . . . necessarily hold true
online.”).
145. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 84.072(4) (West, Westlaw through 2012
Reg. Sess.) (“A notice sent . . . to an electronic mail address . . . is presumed to
have been received . . . .”); Am. Boat Co. I, 418 F.3d at 913 (“If [the court’s ECF]
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presumed received when it enters the recipient’s system.
Proponents argue that a rebuttable presumption is necessary as a
147
safeguard for the recipient.
They assert that, since e-mail is less
148
reliable than paper mail, a recipient should have an avenue for
disputing receipt when a message is intercepted by a spam filter or
149
otherwise fails to reach its destination. A rebuttable presumption
would allow the recipient to present evidence that a spam filter
150
intercepted the record.
First, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the plain language
151
of UETA does not support a presumption of receipt.
Under the
“strong” presumption that a properly sent message is received, “the
real issue is whether the sender properly mailed the notice, not

entries indicated that an e-mail was sent and not returned as undeliverable, then
receipt of that e-mail would be presumed.”); Letter from Cem Kaner, Attorney at
Law, to Donald S. Clark, Sec’y, Fed. Trade Comm’n (Apr. 30, 1990), http://www
.ftc.gov/bcp/icpw/comments/kaner.htm (“[T]he [UETA] receipt rule should
involve a presumption . . . [and] the intended recipient should be able to rebut
the presumption of receipt . . . .”). But see CAL. R. CT. 2.259(a)(4) (West, Westlaw
through Dec. 15, 2012) (“In the absence of the court’s confirmation of receipt and
filing, there is no presumption that the court received and filed the document.”).
146. Convention, supra note 32, art. 10, para. 2 (“An electronic
communication is presumed to be capable of being retrieved by the [recipient]
when it reaches the [recipient]’s electronic address.”); UNIFORM ELECTRONIC
COMMERCE ACT, para. 23(2) (1999) (Can.), available at http://www.ulcc.ca
/en/uniform-acts-en-gb-1/298-electronic-commerce-act/74-electronic-commerce
-act?showall=&start=2 (“An electronic document is presumed to be received by the
addressee, (a) when it enters an information system designated or used by the
addressee . . . .”); see Smedinghoff, supra note 5 (“The UNCITRAL [Convention]
approach may well be a good first step toward addressing the spam filter
problem.”).
147. See Letter from Cem Kaner to Donald S. Clark, supra note 145 (“A rule
that states that e-mail is received when it [enters the recipient’s system] subjects
the recipient to risk . . . .”).
148. See Boss, supra note 57, at 336 n.299 (noting that one out of ten e-mails
fails to reach its destination); Letter from Cem Kaner to Donald S. Clark, supra
note 145 (“[E-mail providers] have no tradition of reliable delivery and no liability
if they fail to deliver e-mail.”).
149. See UNCITRAL, supra note 36, at 61; Letter from Cem Kaner to Donald S.
Clark, supra note 145 (“The intended recipient should be able to rebut the
presumption of receipt.”).
150. See Am. Boat Co. I, 418 F.3d at 914 (ordering an evidentiary hearing to
determine whether the presumption was rebutted); UNCITRAL, supra note 36, at
62; Letter from Cem Kaner to Donald S. Clark, supra note 145 (providing
examples of facts sufficient to rebut presumption of receipt).
151. See Lord, supra note 50, at 58–59; see also Boss, supra note 57, at 336–37 &
n.307 (“The question remains . . . of how to prove or even presume receipt.”);
Smedinghoff, supra note 5 (arguing that UETA contains no presumption of
receipt because it seeks to determine the “‘time’ of receipt”).
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152

whether the intended recipient received it.”
If this presumption
were adopted, UETA’s “receipt” provisions would be surplusage
153
because any properly sent message would be presumed received.
The “weak” presumption, which presumes a message to be received
when it enters the recipient’s system, is similarly unsupported by
154
UETA.
UETA plainly states that a message is received when it
enters the recipient’s system; once the message reaches that point,
155
Further, UETA does
therefore, the presumption is meaningless.
not provide substantive rules of law; it serves only to validate
156
electronic records. Thus, it would be inappropriate to “read in” a
157
presumption of receipt.
158
Second, the relative unreliability of e-mail makes inadvisable
a presumption of receipt. The presumption of receipt of paper
mail grew out of the tremendous reliability of the postal system,
making it extremely unlikely that a properly dispatched letter
159
would fail to be received.
Consequently, the presumption
160
In contrast, an
benefits the sender when receipt is disputed.
electronic record can encounter countless issues on its journey
161
from sender to recipient. Given this unreliability, a presumption
162
of receipt would provide the sender an undeserved benefit.
While courts have touted the reliability of e-mail in their
decisions to support a presumption of receipt, these decisions have

152. In re Schepps Food Stores, Inc., 152 B.R. 136, 139 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
1993).
153. See Id. at 139–40; UETA § 15(b) (1999).
154. See, e.g., Convention, supra note 32, art. 10, para. 2.
155. See UETA § 15(b).
156. UETA Refs. & Annots. Prefatory Note (West, Westlaw through 2011
annual meetings) (“[T]he substantive rules of contracts remain unaffected by
UETA.”).
157. See Lord, supra note 50, at 58–59.
158. See supra note 148.
159. See Ashley Wire Co. v. Ill. Steel Co., 45 N.E. 410, 413 (Ill. 1896).
160. See, e.g., 57 THOMAS J. CZELUSTA ET AL., NEW YORK JURISPRUDENCE 2D
EVIDENCE AND WITNESSES § 139 (2012), available at Westlaw NYJUR EVIDENCE
(“[A] failure to show that the letter was correctly addressed will deprive the sender of
the benefit of such presumption.” (emphasis added)).
161. See supra text accompanying notes 100–105. See Email Delivery Problems
Explained, TOP WEB HOSTS, http://www.topwebhosts.org/articles/email-delivery
-problems.php (last visited Feb. 20, 2013), for a list of potential e-mail delivery
problems.
162. Telephone Interview with R. David Whitaker, Counsel, Buckley Sandler
LLP (Sept. 17, 2012) (all opinions, conclusions, or recommendations expressed
are those of Mr. Whitaker and do not necessarily reflect the views of Buckley
Sandler LLP).
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163

been limited to receipt of ECF notices.
ECF systems are likely
more reliable than commercial e-mail systems because they are less
164
likely to have delivery problems.
Further, the court receives a
“bounce-back” message when an ECF notice fails to reach the
165
Finally, attorneys have a duty to monitor the
recipient’s system.
166
docket, making ECF notices a mere convenience.
For these
reasons, a court is unlikely to lend the same level of deference to a
commercial e-mail system; however, a court could be justified in
applying a presumption if a messaging system is as reliable as
167
ECF.
In conclusion, a rebuttable presumption does provide the
recipient an opportunity to dispute receipt.
However, a
presumption is inadvisable because it opposes the plain language of
UETA and ignores the relative unreliability of e- mail.
B.

E-SIGN Consumer Protection Provisions
1.

General Requirements and Limited Scope

Next, this note will explore whether the E-SIGN consumer
disclosure provision provides protection to consumers when a
168
message sent by a business is intercepted by a spam filter. Unlike
the Model Law and UETA, which apply generally to consumers
169
without any consumer-specific rules, E-SIGN provides specific
163. See, e.g., Am. Boat Co. v. Unknown Sunken Barge (Am. Boat Co. I), 418
F.3d 910, 914 (8th Cir. 2005); Dempster v. Dempster, 404 F. Supp. 2d 445, 449
(E.D.N.Y. 2005).
164. Am. Boat Co. v. Unknown Sunken Barge (Am. Boat Co. II), 567 F.3d 348,
351 (8th Cir. 2009) (“The district court’s CM/ECF administrator . . . testified that
the system had never experienced a glitch . . . [and that he had] ‘100 percent’
confidence that the Notice was received by [the attorney’s system].”).
165. See id.; Moore v. United States, No. S 04-0423 FCD JFM, 2005 WL
1984745, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2005), rev’d on other grounds, 262 F. App’x 828
(9th Cir. 2008).
166. Fox v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 389 F.3d 1291, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(“Regardless whether [the attorney] received the e-mail notice, he remained
obligated to monitor the court’s docket.”); see also Moore, 2005 WL 1984745, at *5
(“[The attorney] did not make an effort to obtain those communications through
[the online docket] . . . .”).
167. Cf., e.g., Kunz, supra note 11, at 400 (describing the “dedicated modem
connections” of EDI communications).
168. “‘[C]onsumer’ means an individual who obtains, through a transaction,
products or services which are used primarily for personal, family, or household
purposes . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 7006(1) (2006).
169. See UETA § 3 legis. n.4 (1999); UNCITRAL, supra note 21, at 24–25
(“[T]here [is] no reason why situations involving consumers should be excluded
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170

consumer protection.
It should be noted, however, that this
171
Obviously, it protects only
provision has a limited scope.
consumers; in addition, it applies only to records sent to consumers,
172
not records sent by them.
Further, E-SIGN mandates consumer
consent only when notice in writing is legally required by state or
173
federal law.
Written notice is not legally required in most
174
situations, including situations involving contract formation.
The E-SIGN consumer protection provision sets up redundant
procedures to ensure that the consumer has consented to receiving
175
electronic records and that the records can be reliably received.
In transactions governed by E-SIGN, any notice for which a writing
is legally required may not be provided electronically until the
176
consumer “has affirmatively consented to such use.”
Among
other requirements, the consumer must be provided a “clear and
conspicuous statement” explaining the hardware and software
requirements for accessing and retaining the records, the
consumer’s right to obtain the record in paper form, and the
177
procedure for withdrawing consent.
After receiving this
statement, the consumer must provide electronic consent in a way
178
that demonstrates she can access the electronic documents.
Unless these requirements are met, an electronic record does not
satisfy a business’s legal obligation to provide information to a
179
consumer in writing.
Subsection (c)(1)(D) outlines situations in which the entity
providing notice must reaffirm consent:

from the scope of the Model Law . . . .”).
170. See 15 U.S.C. § 7001(c).
171. See Wittie & Winn, supra note 18, at 303–05 (“[T]he consumer consent
provisions apply in limited circumstances.”).
172. Id. at 304; see 15 U.S.C. § 7001(c)(1) (protecting electronic records
“provided or made available to a consumer”).
173. Wittie & Winn, supra note 18, at 304; see 15 U.S.C. § 7001(c)(1).
174. Wittie & Winn, supra note 18, at 304. In fact, even after a contract has
been formed, lack of E-SIGN consent to receive records electronically does not
invalidate that contract. DOCUMENTING E-COMMERCE TRANSACTIONS, supra note 22,
§ 4:3; see 15 U.S.C. § 7001(c)(3).
175. BALLON, supra note 22, § 15.02[2][C].
176. 15 U.S.C. § 7001(c)(1)(A).
177. Id. § 7001(c)(1)(B)–(C).
178. Id. § 7001(c)(1)(C)(ii). Electronic consent or confirmation can be
achieved by any means that “reasonably demonstrates” consent to accept
electronic records. Id. For a list of best practices in obtaining electronic consent,
see DOCUMENTING E-COMMERCE TRANSACTIONS, supra note 22, § 4:3.
179. See 15 U.S.C. § 7001(c)(1).
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[A]fter the consent of a consumer [has been obtained], if
a change in the hardware or software requirements needed to
access or retain electronic records creates a material risk
that the consumer will not be able to access or retain a
subsequent electronic record that was the subject of the
consent, the person providing the electronic record
[must]—
(i) provide[] the consumer with a statement of (I) the
revised hardware and software requirements for access to
and retention of the electronic records, and (II) the right
to withdraw consent . . . ; and
(ii) again compl[y] with [the consent requirements
180
described above].
Based on this provision, a business may be required to notify a
consumer when its e-mail practices create a risk that a message will
be intercepted by a spam filter. However, two ambiguities in the
provision make this conclusion uncertain. First, what spam
practices could constitute a “change in the hardware or software
requirements needed to access . . . a subsequent electronic
181
Second, what spam practices could constitute a
record”?
182
“material risk” that the record will not be received?
2.

“Change in Requirements” and “Material Risk”

When Congress debated E-SIGN in 2000, it anticipated that
changes in technology would necessitate changes in the way
183
electronic records are sent and received. For example, a business
may undergo a system upgrade to implement newly installed
184
hardware. A particular web browser may no longer be supported
185
by the sender’s or recipient’s system. In essence, the redisclosure
requirement could apply to any change, no matter how trivial, in
the hardware and software requirements needed for the recipient
186
to receive the sender’s message.

180. Id. § 7001(c)(1)(D) (emphasis added).
181. See id.
182. See id.
183. See Robert A. Cook et al., The Electronic Signatures in Global and National
Commerce Act—A Review of the Act’s Consumer Disclosure Requirements, 54 CONSUMER
FIN. L.Q. REP. 315, 322 (2000).
184. See BALLON, supra note 22, § 15.02[2][C].
185. See, e.g., Supported Browsers, GMAIL, support.google.com/mail/bin/answer
.py?hl=en&answer=6557 (last visited Feb. 20, 2013).
186. Telephone Interview with R. David Whitaker, supra note 162.
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However, too broad of an interpretation could burden e187
commerce and annoy consumers who would be inundated by
188
redisclosure notifications.
Congress sought to protect consumer
189
Therefore,
interests while limiting the burden on e-commerce.
E-SIGN was written to require redisclosure only when changes in
hardware or software requirements pose a “material risk” to receipt
190
by the consumer.
Congress did not, however, provide what constitutes a material
risk. A fact is material when “knowledge of the item would affect a
191
person’s decision-making.”
Therefore, a change in hardware or
software requirements is material, requiring redisclosure under ESIGN, when knowledge of the change would affect the recipient’s
decision to accept documents electronically.
Some changes in required hardware or software would almost
certainly not affect a recipient’s decision to continue receiving
electronic documents. For example, the release of a new version of
a web browser does not create a material risk because upgrades are
192
readily available.
In fact, many electronic disclosure agreements
state that only the most recent version of a web browser is
193
Conversely, a change may be material if the sender
supported.
decides to no longer support any version of a popular web
194
browser.
There are several business practices concerning spam filters
that likely constitute material risks. For example, a recipient’s
187. See Wittie & Winn, supra note 18, at 307 (“[The E-SIGN consumer
consent provisions] place a high compliance burden on businesses.”).
188. See id. (“[C]onsumers . . . will need to wade through lengthy and perhaps
repetitive consent forms in order to do business electronically.”).
189. See 15 U.S.C. § 7005(b) (2006) (authorizing an evaluation of the burdens
that E-SIGN imposes on e-commerce); Cook et al., supra note 183, at 316
(asserting that Congress sought to provide consumer protections while limiting
burdens to e-commerce); see also Fed. Trade Comm’n & Dep’t of Commerce, ESIGN: The Consumer Consent Provision in Section 101(c)(1)(C)(ii), FED. TRADE
COMMISSION (June 2001), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/06/esign7.htm (reporting
on the benefits and burdens that E-SIGN imposes on e-commerce).
190. 15 U.S.C. § 7001(c)(1)(D).
191. E.g., Huston v. Procter & Gamble Paper Prods. Corp., 568 F.3d 100, 107
(3d Cir. 2009) (quoting BLACKS’ LAW DICTIONARY 998 (8th ed. 2004)); In re AFI
Holding, Inc., 530 F.3d 832, 846 (9th Cir. 2008) (same).
192. Telephone Interview with R. David Whitaker, supra note 162; see, e.g.,
Internet Explorer 9 Delivery Through Automatic Updates, MICROSOFT, http://technet
.microsoft.com/en-us/ie/gg615599.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 2013).
193. Telephone Interview with R. David Whitaker, supra note 162.
194. See, e.g., The Associated Press, AOL to End Support of Netscape Navigator,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2007, at C8.
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decision to accept electronic documents would certainly be
affected if the sender increased the “spam score” of its electronic
195
196
records or used a server relay that is listed on several RBLs. It is
less clear whether a recipient’s decision would be affected if the
197
sender begins to send more bulk e-mails.
Statements from congressional debates confirm that E-SIGN
intends to place the burden of consent requirements on the
sender:
Most individuals lack the technological sophistication to
know the exact technical specifications of their computer
equipment and software. It is appropriate to require
companies to establish an “electronic connection” with
their customers in order to provide assurance that the
consumer will be able to access the information in the
198
electronic form in which it will be sent.
One could argue that this “electronic connection” is severed when
a sender acts in a way that greatly increases the chance of its
electronic records being intercepted by a spam filter. It is likely,
therefore, that a sender who does so is required to reestablish
consent from the consumer.
In conclusion, while the E-SIGN consumer disclosure
provision may provide consumer protection from businesses
engaged in negligent or sharp practices, its limited scope makes it
inapplicable in a majority of situations.
C.

Accountability Test

The third spam filter solution accounts for each party’s ability
to prevent a spam filter from intercepting an electronic record. It
holds the sender responsible if its message is likely to be
intercepted by a spam filter, and it holds the recipient responsible
if the recipient maintains an unreasonable spam filter or fails to
199
Rather than
check for filtered messages in a junk mail folder.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 92–95.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 84–87.
197. A sender of bulk e-mails is more likely to be included on an RBL.
Telephone Interview with Michael Fleming, supra note 52.
198. 146 CONG. REC. S5230 (daily ed. June 15, 2000) (statement of Sens.
Hollings, Wyden, & Sarbanes); see also 146 CONG. REC. H4360 (daily ed. June 14,
2000) (statement of Rep. Tauzin) (“[T]he provisions regarding consent afford
consumers with the greatest possible safeguards against fraud imaginable.”).
199. Cf. Smedinghoff, supra note 5 (“If the intended recipient does not
receive a message because the message is quarantined or deleted by a spam filter,
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200

creating a “bright-line rule,” this test is necessarily fact-specific.
For example, while the term “Viagra” is likely to raise the spam
201
score of a message, that term may be appropriate if the sender is
a pharmaceutical company.
Late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century cases involving
mistaken telegraph transmissions provide historical support for the
accountability test. These cases generally stated that a telegram
recipient could not be held accountable for acting upon an
erroneous message when there was no reason for the recipient to
202
doubt the accuracy of the message,
even if the telegram
203
The telegraph test was
contradicted previous correspondence.
fact-specific: the recipient could not be penalized for relying on a
message that “was not unintelligible . . . [or] couched in
204
extraordinary or unusual language.”
If, however, the recipient
acted on a message that he should reasonably have known
contained errors, then the recipient was held accountable for any
205
negative effect.
UETA uses a similar test to determine the effect of an error in
206
transmission.
If both parties have agreed to use a security
procedure to detect errors in transmission, and an error occurs due
to one party’s failure to conform to the procedure, the conforming
207
party can avoid any negative effect caused by the error.
The

has the sender failed to fulfill a legal obligation to deliver information, or has the
recipient assumed the risk?”).
200. See Campbell v. Gen. Dynamics Gov’t Sys. Corp., 407 F.3d 546, 554 (1st
Cir. 2005) (using a “fact-dependent” test to determine whether appropriate notice
was given); Reece v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 98 F.3d 839, 843 (5th Cir. 1996)
(declining to establish a “bright-line rule” regarding who is authorized to receive
service of process), abrogated in part by Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe
Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344 (1999).
201. See Bowles et al., supra note 81, at 9.
202. See, e.g., McCarty v. W. Union Tel. Co., 91 S.W. 976, 977 (Mo. Ct. App.
1906); W. Union Tel. Co. v. Beals, 76 N.W. 903, 905 (Neb. 1898); W. Union Tel.
Co. v. Edsall, 12 S.W. 41, 43 (Tex. 1889).
203. See Henry v. W. Union. Tel. Co., 131 P. 812, 813 (Wash. 1913) (holding
that the recipient could reasonably have assumed that his purchasing agent had
been successful in reducing the offer).
204. Beals, 76 N.W. at 905.
205. See, e.g., W. Union Tel. Co. v. Wright, 18 Ill. App. 337, 340 (1885)
(finding the recipient contributorily negligent for acting on an erroneous
telegram after being informed of the mistake); Hart v. Direct U.S. Cable Co., 86
N.Y. 633, 633–34 (1881) (holding that the recipient “took the risk” of interpreting
a message that contained “unintelligible jargon”).
206. See UETA § 10 (1999).
207. Id. § 10(1).
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provision “operates against the non-conforming party, i.e., the party
in the best position to have avoided the change or error, regardless of
208
whether that person is the sender or recipient.”
Similarly, the
accountability test seeks to hold responsible the party in the best
209
position to avoid interception by a spam filter.
The following sections will examine the factors controlled by
the sender and the recipient and argue that each party should be
responsible for the consequences of its actions concerning those
factors.
1.

Factors Controlled by the Sender

The sender has control over the content and dispatch of an
electronic record. As shown above, the sender’s deliberate,
reckless, or negligent actions can affect whether a message is likely
210
to be intercepted by a spam filter. If a message is filtered before
entering the recipient’s system, the sender’s actions are
inconsequential because the message has failed to be received
211
anyway.
But what if the message is filtered after it enters the
recipient’s system? According to the language of UETA, it would
appear that the message was received and the recipient “assumed
212
the risk” of using a spam filter.
However, two UETA provisions
may potentially protect a recipient from a sender’s sharp or
negligent practices. First, an electronic record must be “addressed
213
properly.”
Second, the record must be “in a form capable of
214
being processed” by the recipient’s system.
a.

“Addressed Properly”

First, an electronic record must be “addressed properly” or
215
“otherwise directed properly” to the recipient’s system.
The
message must contain “specific information which will direct the

208. Id. § 10 cmt. 2 (emphasis added).
209. See id.
210. See supra notes 84–87 & 92–95.
211. UETA § 15(b). But see infra Part IV.C.2 (suggesting a broader definition
of the recipient’s system).
212. Smedinghoff, supra note 5, at 2; see also UETA § 15(b) (stating that an
electronic record is received when it enters the recipient’s processing system).
213. UETA § 15(a)(1).
214. Id. § 15(a)(2). An electronic record must also be “in a form capable of
being processed” at the time of receipt. Id. § 15(b)(2).
215. Id. § 15(a)(1).
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216

record to the intended recipient.”
An improperly addressed
217
message has not been sent. Although a message may be received
218
even if not properly sent, an improper address affects receipt
because the message is less likely to enter the recipient’s system and
the recipient is less likely to be “able to retrieve the electronic
219
record.”
Obviously, the sender has not properly addressed a message in
220
which the recipient’s electronic address is incorrect. In addition,
a message may not be properly addressed when the sender’s
electronic practices increase the likelihood of the sender being
“blacklisted,” because inclusion on an RBL greatly decreases the
chance that the message will be “direct[ed] . . . to the intended
221
recipient.”
Several factors affect a sender’s likelihood of being
blacklisted, including the reputation of the sender’s domain name
and the reputation of the system or server relays used by the
222
sender. If sending messages in bulk, a sender is more likely to be
223
blacklisted if the recipient list is “opt-out” rather than “opt-in” or
224
if the sender fails to include an “opt-out” statement.
While courts have not published opinions on what constitutes
a “properly addressed” electronic record under UETA, ample case
law exists relating to paper records:
[A] “proper” address would be “characterized by
appropriateness or suitability” for its intended purpose.
The purpose of an address is to supply information for
delivery of mail to its intended destination. Hence, an
address containing errors inconsequential to delivery is
still proper.
. . . Where an address, ex ante, enables delivery to the
intended destination, then that address is proper and any
216. Id. § 15 cmt. 2. Mass sending, as in the case of bulk messages, is covered
as long as the messages are sent to individuals rather than as a “general broadcast
message.” Id.
217. Id. § 15(a).
218. See id. § 15(b) (not requiring proper dispatch as a precursor to receipt).
219. Id. § 15(b)(1).
220. See id. § 15(a)(1) (requiring that the sender direct the message to a
system designated by the recipient or a system used by the recipient for similar
messages).
221. Telephone Interview with Michael Fleming, supra note 52; see UETA § 15
(a)(1), cmt. 2.
222. Telephone Interview with Michael Fleming, supra note 52.
223. RBLs tend to be more skeptical of “opt-out” lists because the recipient
has not affirmatively consented to being included on the list. Id.
224. Id.
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225

error is inconsequential.
An error is inconsequential when it is “so minor that it would not
226
Thus, an address is improper if
prevent delivery of the notice.”
227
an error would cause a message to fail to reach its destination.
Using this definition, courts have generally held that an
incorrect zip code is an inconsequential error and does not result
228
in an improper address. A zip code “facilitate[s] the delivery” of
229
mail but is not a necessary part of the address.
If the letter
contains the correct name and address, an incorrect zip code is
unlikely to prevent delivery or cause delay, especially when the
230
error is minor. In contrast, a letter with an incorrect address and
231
zip code is improperly addressed.
Blacklisting factors are more similar to an incorrect name or
address than an incorrect zip code. While an incorrect zip code
usually is inconsequential and a mere inconvenience to postal
232
workers, blacklisting factors are more than inconvenient because
233
they can prevent a message from being delivered at all.
An
absence of blacklisting factors is a necessary part of the sender’s
234
message and does more than merely “facilitate the delivery.”
Therefore, a recipient may be protected from a sender’s sharp
or negligent practices if the sender engages in blacklisting factors
225. Santoro v. Principi, 274 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citation
omitted); see, e.g., Busquets-Ivars v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 2003)
(determining whether a piece of mail was “properly directed”); Judkins v.
Davenport, 59 S.W.3d 689, 690–91 (Tex. App. 2000) (same).
226. Pickering v. Comm’r, 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 2152, at *2 (1998).
227. See Santoro, 274 F.3d at 1370; Pickering, 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 2152, at *2.
228. See, e.g., Price v. Comm’r, 76 T.C. 389, 392–93 (1981); Judkins, 59 S.W.3d
at 691. But see Busquets-Ivars, 333 F.3d at 1010 (“The INS fails to [properly send the
letter] because the zip code used was incorrect.”).
229. Judkins, 59 S.W.3d at 691; see Pickering, 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 2152, at *2
(“[T]he ZIP code number . . . is for the convenience of the Postal Service and is
helpful to ensure prompt delivery.” (quoting Watkins v. Comm’r, 63 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1710 (1992))); Price, 76 T.C. at 392 (“The use of zip codes is for the
convenience of the Postal Service . . . .”).
230. Pickering, 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 2152, at *3 (unlikely to prevent delivery);
Smetanka v. Comm’r, 74 T.C. 715, 719 (1980) (unlikely to cause delay).
231. Int’l Television Film Prod., Inc. v. Comm’r, 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 1049, 1049
(1983).
232. See Pickering, 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 2152, at *2 (“[T]he ZIP code number . . .
is for the convenience of the Postal Service . . . .” (quoting Watkins, 63 T.C.M.
(CCH) at 1710 (1992))).
233. Id.; see also Santoro v. Principi, 274 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(“Where an address . . . enables delivery to the intended destination, then that
address is proper and any error is inconsequential.”).
234. See Judkins, 59 S.W.3d at 691.
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that cause the message to be improperly addressed. In that case,
the sender should be responsible for nonreceipt because the
sender was in the best position to prevent the filter from
intercepting the message.
b.

“Form Capable of Being Processed”

Second, an electronic record must be “in a form capable of
being processed by [the recipient’s] system” at the time of sending
235
and at the time of receipt.
While UETA does not address the
236
legal effectiveness of electronic records, this provision implicitly
involves the content of the message. The sender has sole control
over the content of the message. Specifically, she has the ability to
avoid practices that would tend to raise the message’s “spam
237
score.”
If a message has a high spam score, it may not be “in a
form capable of being processed” by the recipient’s system because
238
the message is likely to never reach the recipient’s inbox.
While courts have not examined the content of electronic
records for factors relating to a message’s “spam score,” e-mail
content has been inspected for factors relating to inconspicuous
239
notice. In Campbell v. General Dynamics Government Systems Corp.,
an employer initiated a new policy by which all unresolved disputes
240
would be subject to mandatory arbitration.
The employees were
241
notified of the new policy via e-mail. Neither the subject heading
nor the introductory paragraphs of the e-mail gave any indication
242
that the message was of any importance.
While subsequent
paragraphs explained that unresolved disputes would now be
settled by arbitration, the e-mail did not notify employees that the
new policy eliminated the right to resolve disputes in a judicial
forum, nor did the e-mail mention that continuation of
243
employment constituted acceptance of the policy’s terms.
This
information was available in the policy itself; however, the policy
235. UETA § 15(a)(2), (b)(2) (1999).
236. See id. § 15 cmt. 1.
237. Telephone Interview with Michael Fleming, supra note 52; see supra Part
III.B.
238. See UETA § 15(a)(2), (b)(2).
239. 407 F.3d 546 (1st Cir. 2005).
240. Id. at 547.
241. Id. at 547–48.
242. Campbell v. Gen. Dynamics Gov’t Sys. Corp., 321 F. Supp. 2d 142, 144
(D. Mass. 2004), aff’d, 407 F.3d 546 (1st Cir. 2005).
243. Campbell, 407 F.3d at 548.
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244

was not attached to the e-mail.
To access the policy, employees
had to follow a hyperlink that led to a page on the company’s
245
intranet site.
The e-mail did not require a response from
employees acknowledging receipt or their understanding of the
246
new policy.
When an employee sought judicial review of his termination
over a year later, the company asserted that the employee’s dispute
247
should be resolved through arbitration as described by the policy.
Although the employee conceded that the e-mail technically was
248
“received,” he argued that the arbitration agreement was not
binding because the content of the e-mail belied the importance of
the subject matter—the renouncement of an important legal
249
right.
The court relied on the content of the e-mail in determining
250
that the message did not provide fair warning to the employee.
The court found that the e-mail “undersold the significance of the
Policy” because neither the subject heading nor the text put the
recipient on notice “that arbitration was to become mandatory and
thereby extinguish an employee’s access to a judicial forum as a
251
The court also examined the
means for dispute resolution.”
“tone and choice of phrase[s]” within the e-mail and found them to
252
be lacking.
Although the policy itself was written in “clear,
contractual language,” the e-mail “downplay[ed] the obligations set
253
forth in the Policy.”
It did not explicitly state that the policy
would eliminate an employee’s right to seek judicial review and
that the policy was legally binding if the recipient continued
254
employment. To paraphrase using the language of UETA, the email was not “in a form capable of being processed” by the recipient

244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 549.
248. Id. at 548–49 (presenting evidence that e-mail was “opened . . . two
minutes after it was sent” but not that it was read).
249. See id. at 549 (“[T]he company’s e-mail communication had failed to give
the plaintiff adequate notice that the Policy was intended to form a binding
agreement to arbitrate.”).
250. Id. at 557.
251. Id. at 558.
252. Id. at 557.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 557–58.
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255

because it did not provide him with notice of its importance.
Similarly, an electronic record with spam characteristics is not
“in a form capable of being processed” by the recipient’s system
because it resembles spam rather than an important
256
communication. By using language and conventions that raise an
electronic record’s “spam score,” a sender may “trick” the spam
filter into believing that a message is unimportant and potentially
257
harmful. As in Campbell, the “tone and choice of phrases” used in
such a message “downplay” the message’s importance because the
recipient’s filter is likely to misinterpret the message and filter it
258
before it reaches the recipient’s inbox.
A message with a high
spam score may fail to put the spam filter on notice that the
message should be delivered to the inbox rather than sent to the
259
junk mail folder (or deleted altogether).
In conclusion, a sender who deliberately or negligently creates
a message with a high spam score may fail to send a message “in a
form capable of being processed” by the recipient’s system;
260
therefore, the message is neither sent nor received.
If so, the
sender should be responsible for the recipient’s lack of awareness
of the message because the sender was in the best position to
prevent the spam filter from intercepting the message.
2.

Factors Controlled by the Recipient

The recipient has no influence over the content and dispatch
of an electronic record; thus, the factors under its control are more
limited than those of the sender. However, the recipient does
control the location of its spam filters and the intensity of those
261
If an overactive spam filter within the recipient’s system
filters.
incorrectly intercepts a legitimate message (i.e., a message without
255. See UETA § 15(a), (b) (1999).
256. See id. § 15(b).
257. See Campbell, 407 F.3d at 557 (“[T]he e-mail announcement . . .
downplay[ed] the obligations set forth in the [p]olicy.”).
258. Id. at 557–58.
259. See id. at 557 (“[T]he e-mail communication, in and of itself, was not
enough to put a reasonable employee on inquiry notice of an alteration to the
contractual aspects of the employment relationship.”); cf. Whitaker, supra note 47,
at 24–25 (noting that the Federal Trade Commission requires the content of
online notices to be “reasonably understandable and designed to call attention to
the information that must be disclosed.”).
260. See UETA § 15(a), (b).
261. See Bowles et al., supra note 81, at 13 (“[S]pam filters . . . can be
configured in various ways . . . .”).
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the defects described in Part IV.C.1), the message is likely received
262
In such a situation, the
because it already entered the system.
recipient has the responsibility to check the junk mail folder or be
263
held responsible for receipt of the message. But what if the filter
is located outside of the recipient’s system or is maintained by a
third party employed by the recipient?
According to the language of UETA, an electronic record is
not received until it enters the recipient’s “information processing
264
system,” which is defined as “an electronic system for creating,
generating, sending, receiving, storing, displaying, or processing
265
The UETA comments provide that the “key
information.”
aspect” of an information processing system is that the user is able
266
to access it. This suggests that an information processing system,
viewed broadly, may encompass more than the system itself, so long
267
as the user retains access.
Moreover, the UETA comments assert that the UETA
definition of “information processing system” is consistent with the
268
Model Law’s definition of “information system.”
The Model Law
Guide to Enactment provides: “The definition of ‘information system’
is intended to cover the entire range of technical means used for
269
transmitting, receiving and storing information.”
Using this
broader definition, a recipient would likely be held responsible for
spam filters under its control, even if outside of the recipient’s
system, because the filters are within the recipient’s “entire range”
270
of access.
Additionally, an analogy to paper mail suggests that a broad
definition of the recipient’s system likely includes spam filters
operated by a third-party agent of the recipient. Courts have
universally held that process is received by a corporation when it is
271
acquired by an agent authorized to receive such documents.
262. See UETA § 15(b)(1).
263. Telephone Interview with Michael Fleming, supra note 52.
264. UETA § 15(b)(1).
265. Id. § 2(11).
266. Id. § 2 cmt. 9.
267. Telephone Interview with Michael Fleming, supra note 52; see UETA § 2
cmt. 9.
268. UETA § 2 cmt. 9; see Model Law, supra note 32, art. 2(f) (providing an
almost identical definition).
269. UNCITRAL, supra note 21, at 29 (emphasis added).
270. Telephone Interview with Michael Fleming, supra note 52; see
UNCITRAL, supra note 21, at 29.
271. Tech Hills II Assocs. v. Phx. Home Life Mut. Ins. Co., 5 F.3d 963, 968
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Since the agent has specifically been chosen by the corporation to
receive process, courts reason that receipt occurs when the agent
receives the process rather than when the process actually comes
272
into the hands of the corporation.
Courts fear that establishing
receipt as the time the corporation receives the process would
result in “lost homework” excuses where the corporation asserts it
did not receive the process until long after it had been received by
273
the agent.
Although there is no “bright-line rule” regarding who is
authorized to receive process, courts have found service of process
to be sufficient when received by agents and employees who are
“responsible and sufficiently familiar with legal matters” and who
can “forward the pleading to the proper individual or department
274
within the company.”
Thus, service to a “run-of-the-mill
275
276
corporate employee” or to a security guard would not result in
receipt, while service to a company’s receptionist, local store
277
Similarly, a notice is
manager, or CEO would result in receipt.
received under the Revised U.C.C. when “it is duly delivered . . . at
the place of business through which the contract was made or at
another location held out by that person as the place for receipt of such
278
communications.”
A third-party spam filter should be regarded as a “receptionist”
rather than a “security guard.” The filter has been “chosen” by the
recipient (or the recipient’s system manager) and is “authorized to

(6th Cir. 1993); Barr v. Zurich Ins. Co., 985 F. Supp. 701, 702 (S.D. Tex. 1997); see
Reece v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 98 F.3d 839, 843–44 (5th Cir. 1996) (“[Sending the
pleading to the corporation’s CEO] is a perfectly sensible way to notify a
responsible individual within the corporation . . . .”); Roe v. O’Donohue, 38 F.3d
298, 304 (7th Cir. 1994); Edling v. IMI Sys., Inc., No. CIV.A. 301CV2817-M, 2002
WL 240135, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 15, 2002). Although Murphy Brothers, Inc. v.
Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344 (1999), repealed the so-called “receipt
rule” and disallowed informal service of process via fax or photocopy, Murphy
Brothers does not suggest that formal service upon an authorized agent is invalid.
Edling, 2002 WL 240135, at *2.
272. See Barr, 985 F. Supp. at 703 (“Registered agents exist to receive
process . . . . Defendant chose this one.”).
273. Edling, 2002 WL 240135, at *2.
274. Reece, 98 F.3d at 843.
275. Barr, 985 F. Supp. at 703.
276. Tech Hills II, 5 F.3d at 968.
277. Reece, 98 F.3d at 843–44 (CEO); Roe v. O’Donohue, 38 F.3d 298, 304 (7th
Cir. 1994) (receptionist); Allison v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 159 F. Supp. 550,
551–52 (D.N.H. 1957) (store manager).
278. U.C.C. § 1-202(e) (2001) (emphasis added).
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279

accept” and inspect all of the recipient’s messages. Like an agent
authorized to receive process, a third-party filter has the
capability—and responsibility—to forward the message to the
280
appropriate individual.
Moreover, the recipient certainly has
identified the third-party spam filter as a “place for receipt” of
electronic records because all records must pass through the filter
281
before entering the recipient’s system.
If messages could be reviewed by a third-party filter prior to
receipt, a recipient could engage in a “lost homework” excuse and
potentially avoid receipt by preventing the message from entering
282
Review prior to receipt is contrary to the plan
her system.
language of UETA because awareness of a message is not a
283
precursor to receipt.
Further, allowing such review would result
in a media-specific rule (which UETA has expressly avoided)
because it would allow agents to receive traditional mail but not
284
electronic mail.
Therefore, barring any sharp or negligent practices on the
part of the sender, recipients should be responsible for the actions
of their spam filters, even if the filter is located outside of the
recipient’s system or operated by a third-party agent of the
recipient. If a message is incorrectly filtered by an overactive spam
filter within the recipient’s control, the recipient has a
responsibility to check her junk mail folder or otherwise be held
responsible for receipt of the message.
3.

Application to Hypotheticals

Application of the accountability test to the hypotheticals in
Part I demonstrates that the test is a reasonable and balanced
285
In “Awaiting Acceptance,” an e-mail was intercepted
approach.
279. See Tech Hills II, 5 F.3d at 968; Barr, 985 F. Supp. at 702–03.
280. See Reece, 98 F.3d at 843–44 (“[T]his method of delivery is a perfectly
sensible way to notify a responsible individual . . . .”).
281. See U.C.C. § 1-202(e).
282. See Edling v. IMI Sys., Inc., No. CIV.A. 301CV2817-M, 2002 WL 240135, at
*2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 15, 2002); cf. Snijders, supra note 50, at 80 (arguing in favor of
a receipt rule that does not require the recipient to view the message).
283. See UETA § 15(e) (1999).
284. See UETA Refs. & Annots. Prefatory Note B (West, Westlaw through 2011
annual meetings) (noting that the Act merely seeks to remove “biases and
barriers” so that existing law will apply to an electronic context).
285. Additionally, unlike the E-SIGN consumer protection provision, the
accountability test can apply to any transaction governed by UETA. Compare 15
U.S.C. § 7001(c) (2006) (applying only where a writing is legally required), with
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286

due to an overactive spam filter operated by the recipient’s agent.
Although the filter was located outside of the recipient’s system, it
was still under the recipient’s control; therefore, the e-mail was
287
received. In “Rotten Recall,” the sender deliberately doctored an
288
e-mail to ensure that it would be intercepted by a spam filter.
The e-mail was not “in a form capable of being processed” by the
289
recipient’s system. Since the sender had control over the e-mail’s
content, the e-mail was not received, even though the message may
290
technically have entered the recipient’s system.
In contrast, the
sender in “Flower Fanatic” did not increase the e-mail’s “spam
291
score.” Since the recipient had control over, and in fact created,
the rule that rerouted the e-mail to a separate folder, the e-mail was
292
received.
Moreover, the accountability test conforms to the underlying
293
policies of UETA. Requiring parties to take responsibility for the
factors under their control will result in more certainty as to how
294
The accountability test is a “reasonable
UETA is applied.
practice” because it encourages each party to take responsibility for
its practices and protects parties from sharp or negligent
295
practices.
Finally, protecting recipients from unscrupulous
senders will “promote public confidence in the validity, integrity
296
and reliability of electronic commerce.”
V. CONCLUSION
None of the electronic communication laws discussed in this
297
note command a party to do business electronically.
If a party
voluntarily elects to benefit from e-commerce, she should be
responsible for having some understanding of the required
UETA § 5(b) (applying where parties have “agreed to conduct transactions by
electronic means”).
286. See supra text accompanying note 1.
287. See supra Part IV.C.2.
288. See supra text accompanying note 2.
289. See UETA § 15(a)–(b).
290. See supra Part IV.C.1.b.
291. See supra text accompanying note 3.
292. See supra Part IV.C.2.
293. See UETA § 6.
294. See id. § 6 cmt. 1(b).
295. See id. § 6(2).
296. Id. § 6 cmt. 1(f).
297. See 15 U.S.C. § 7001(b)(2) (2006); Convention, supra note 32, art. 8,
para. 2; UCITA § 107(b) (2002); UETA § 5(a).
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technology. In the paper world, a sender could not argue that a
298
A recipient
letter with the incorrect address was properly sent.
could not argue that a letter was not received because she did not
know where the mailroom was.
In the electronic world, it should be the same. While senders
and recipients should be protected from unfair practices, they must
have a general understanding of the system in which they conduct
business. This includes taking responsibility of the dispatch and
receipt factors under each party’s control. While understanding
complex electronic communication processes may involve a sharp
learning curve, that is simply “the cost of doing e-business.”

298. See, e.g., Int’l Television Film Prod., Inc. v. Comm’r, 45 T.C.M. (CCH)
1049 (1983).
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